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The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the status of EU citizenship to the nationals of Member States. Central to that status is the right
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, in combination with the right to non-discrimination on the ground
of nationality. This contribution discusses, amongst others, whether or not the ECJ has been immune for the decline of the enthusiasm
for a citizen’s Europe as a result of the economic crisis since the late 2000s. The contributions centres on the development of the ECJ’s
case law on EU citizenship until now and compares it with case law in which the influence of the notion of EU citizenship on the
interpretation of the traditional economically based free movement rights on the free movement of persons (‘market freedoms’) is
acknowledged. The contribution also discusses whether the ECJ’s changed perspective on the scope of the treaty freedoms for
economically active persons is recognized in the ECJ’s Schumacker case law.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the status of EU citi-
zenship to the nationals of Member States (Article 20
TFEU). Central to that status is the right to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States, in combi-
nation with the right to non-discrimination on the ground
of nationality (Article 21 TFEU). Twenty years after the
introduction of the status of EU citizenship, it has mainly
been the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that has given
substance to the status of EU citizenship and the connected
free movement and residence rights. In the context of the
economic crisis since the late 2000s, the public debate
centred on intra EU solidarity. At first, this public debate
was in relation to the public debt crisis and later turned to
migration and the possible negative effects on national
welfare systems. Against this background, the enthusiasm
for a citizen’s Europe declined.
In this contribution, I will discuss whether or not the
ECJ has been immune for this development. Section 2
identifies and discusses, in general, the four different
periods in the development of EU citizenship that can
be recognized in the ECJ’s case law until now. Section 3
discusses how the introduction of EU citizenship has
influenced the ECJ’s interpretation of the traditional eco-
nomically based free movement rights on the free move-
ment of persons (‘market freedoms’) and how this
interpretation relates to the development of the ECJ’s
case law on EU citizenship as discussed in section 2.
Section 4 examines whether the ECJ’s changed perspec-
tive on the scope of the treaty freedoms for economically
active persons is also recognized in the ECJ’s
Schumacker case law. Finally, section 5 gives some
final remarks on the main question addressed in this
contribution.
2 THE COMING OF AGE OF EU CITIZENSHIP: FROM
THE MARKET CITIZEN TO THE REINVENTION OF
NATIONAL BELONGING
1
2.1 Period 1: The Market-Citizen
Prior to the introduction of EU citizenship, the TFEU
provisions on economically active persons related to the
establishment of the internal market. The original aim of
the internal market was to be achieved by the free move-
ment of goods and production factors between Member
States. For this purpose, free movement rights were
introduced on which economic actors could base their
claim whenever a Member State impeded their inter
Member State movement. The focus of these freedoms
was therefore mainly economically based.
However, the ECJ’s case law, predating the introduc-
tion of EU citizenship, already shows signs of a broad
interpretation of the rights of economic migrants; protect-
ing them beyond their role as economic actors.2
Exemplary in this regard is the Carpenter judgment.3 Mr
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1 This paragraph is, to an extent, an abstract of E. W. Ros, EU
Citizenship and Direct Taxation Ch. 11 (EUCOTAX series, nr. 54,
Kluwer Law International 2017).
2 In this regard, Spaventa refers to the ECJ’s case law on access to
social and tax advantages; on family and education rights and on
the rights of the returning migrant. See E. Spaventa, Earned
Citizenship – Understanding Union Citizenship Through Its Scope, in
EU Citizenship and Federalism, The Role of Rights 206–207 (D.
Kochenov eds, Cambridge University Press 2017).
3 Case C-60/00 (Carpenter).
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Carpenter exercised his rights under Article 49 TEC (56
TFEU), because he sold services to nationals of other
Member States and he occasionally travelled to other
Member States. The ECJ found that the ability for Mr
Carpenter to provide services was impaired in case his
spouse was deported, due to the fact that she was respon-
sible for the children when her husband was away on
business. The ECJ only used Article 49 TEC (56 TFEU) to
bring the case within the ambit of EU law, in order to
assess national rules with fundamental rights.4
2.2 Period 2: EU Citizenship as a Fundamental
Status Beyond Market Roots
After the introduction of EU citizenship in the Treaty of
Maastricht, the ECJ followed an ambitious agenda to free
citizenship and the integration project from its market
rationale. During this period, the ECJ argued in various
judgments that EU citizenship is the ‘fundamental status’
of nationals of Member States.5 The first case law of the
ECJ on Article 18 TEC (21 TFEU) dealt with specific
categories of persons in relation to the right to social
assistance in the host Member State. The ‘limitations-
clause’ of Article 18 (1) TEC (21 (1) TFEU) referred to
the three 1990 directives, conferring a general right of
movement and residents for students, retired persons
and those with independent means.6 In fear of migration
waves to Member States with favourable social assistance
schemes, these directives posed two general conditions
on free movement and residence within the EU by eco-
nomically inactive migrants. The conditions are that a
person must have sufficient sickness insurance and suffi-
cient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social
assistance system of the Member State.
The case law of the ECJ concerning persons with an
unclear status in the host Member State, students and
job seekers, clearly showed that the ECJ expanded the
scope of circumstances by which an EU citizen is entitled
to social assistance in the host Member State.7 This case
law is characterized by an expansion of the rights of EU
citizens beyond those explicitly conferred by secondary
legislation. For instance, the Martinez Sala judgment8
and the Trojani judgment9 concerned persons who did
not fulfil the requirement of having sufficient resources
to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance
system of the host Member State. The condition was
laid down in secondary legislation.10 In both cases the
claimants were lawfully residing in the host Member
State. The ECJ held in the Martinez Sala judgment and
the Trojani judgment that as an EU citizen is lawfully
resident in the host Member State, based on national
law, the EU citizen could invoke the principle of non-
discrimination on ground of nationality to claim equal
access to those social benefits which were available to
nationals on the basis of their nationality or residence,
despite the fact that the requirement of having sufficient
resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social
assistance system of the host Member State was not met.
2.3 Period 3: Consolidation of EU Citizenship’s
Rights in Directive 2004/38 (CRD)
The previous period in the development of EU citizen-
ship showed that the ECJ was willing to free citizenship
and the integration process from its market origins. The
next phase in the development of EU citizenship is
characterized by fine tuning of the ECJ’s case law,11 the
development of important new EU citizenship case law,
relating to the exportability of grants12 and derived
rights of third country nationals’ (TCNs) parents and,
4 The ECJ was also willing to interpret the personal scope on the free
movement of economically active persons broadly. The free move-
ment of workers covered the pursuit of effective and genuine
activities to the extent that part-timers were covered. The ECJ
also extended the personal scope to job-seekers, family members
and other related categories. The case law with regard to economic
migrants, predating the introduction of EU citizenship, shows that
the ECJ went far beyond what was necessary to insure free move-
ment rights for economic migrants. In this case law the ‘embryo’ of
what will later become EU citizenship can be seen.
5 For instance; Case C-184/99 (Grzelczyk), at 31; Case C-224/98
(D’Hoop), at 28; Case C-413/99 (Baumbast), at 82.
6 These directives have now been replaced by Directive 2004/38
(CRD). The CRD consolidates all existing rules on the free
movement of persons as they result from the EU treaties, sec-
ondary legislation and ECJ case law. See also s. 2.3 of this
contribution.
7 For a more extensive discussion of this case law, see Ros, supra n. 1,
at Ch. 11, 203–222. In this regard, also mention is made of Case C-
224/02 (Pusa) and Case C-520/04 (Turpeinen) which clearly show
that Art. 18 TEC (Art. 21 TFEU) can be used against the Member
State of origin.
8 Case C-85/96 (Martinez Sala).
9 Case C-456/02 (Trojani).
10 Directive 90/364/EEC on the rights of residence for persons of
sufficient means, Directive 90/365/EEC on the rights of residence
for employees and self-employed who have ceased their occupa-
tional activity and Directive 90/366/EEC on the rights of residence
for students, repealed and replaced by Directive 93/96.
11 In the Bidar judgment (C-209/03), the ECJ stated that it is ‘legitimate
for a host Member State to grant such assistance only to students who have
demonstrated a certain degree of integration into the society of that State’.
Member States have a right to protect themselves against ‘grant-tour-
ism’ in order to ‘ensure that the grant of assistance to cover the main-
tenance costs of students from other Member States does not become an
unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of
assistance which may be granted by that State’. The ECJ ruled that Dany
Bidar was to be considered as ‘settled’ as he did have ‘a genuine link’
with the UK. However, the Bidar judgment did not make clear what
precisely constituted a ‘certain degree of integration’. The later Förster
judgment (C-158/07) sheds further light on where the balance lies
between a certain degree of financial solidarity between Member States
and the pressure of including non-nationals inMember State’s systems
of study finance. Only after a period of five years of lawful and
uninterrupted residence can a student be entitled to equal treatment
regarding social benefits in the host Member State. The five years term
also completely corresponds with the CRD, which at the time was not
applicable. It seems that the Förster judgment and the CRD have
overruled the earlier Bidar judgment with regard to the condition of
being sufficiently integrated.
12 In the Morgan and Bücher judgment (joined Cases C-11/06 and C-
12/06) the ECJ decided that the right of a student loan can also be
limited for ‘outbound’ students, when a Member State runs the risk
of bearing an unreasonable burden. In the Prinz and Seeberger
judgment (joined Cases C-523/11 and C-585/11), the ECJ found
EU CITIZENSHIP AND DIRECT TAXATION
148 EC TAX REVIEW 2018/3
most important, the codification of the ECJ’s case law in
Directive 2004/38 (CRD).13 The CRD consolidates all
existing rules on the free movement of persons as they
result from the EU treaties, secondary legislation and ECJ
case law. In this period two emerging trends can be
recognized.
On the one hand, it can be acknowledged that the
ECJ moves ‘the battleground of citizenship’ to the interpre-
tation of the provisions of the CRD.14 The Martinez Sala
judgment and Trojani judgment showed that a right to
social assistance in the host Member State can be granted
based on EU citizenship as long as the national residence
title is not withdrawn. Based on the Dano judgment,
however, a Member State may now refuse social assis-
tance in case the criteria of the CRD are not met, despite
the fact that an indefinite residence permit was issued
under national law.15 The Dano case concerned Mrs
Dano and her son (both Romanian nationals) staying in
Germany. Mrs Dano is not seeking employment. She is
not trained in a profession and she had never worked in
Romania and/or Germany. Mrs Dano has a residence
permit for unlimited duration in Germany. Mrs Dano
and her son live with Mrs Dano’s sister who provides for
them. Mrs Dano and her son applied for benefits by way
of basic provision in Germany, which are only for job-
seekers. Jobcenter Leipzig, however, refused to grant the
benefits.
The ECJ noted that based on the CRD the host
Member State is not obligated to give social assistance
in the first three months. In case the period of residence
is more than three months, but less than five years
(which is the case with Mrs Dano and her son), the
right of residence for economically inactive persons is
sided by the requirement of having sufficient resources
to avoid becoming a burden to another Member State’s
social assistance system.16 The requirement tries to avoid
claims of inactive EU citizens who move to another
Member State solely to obtain that Member State’s social
assistance.
However, the referring German court did not find the
case as straightforward. The ECJ has in the past regularly
overridden the system of the CRD based on EU citizen-
ship. The ECJ concluded that Mrs Dano and her son did
not have sufficient resources and could therefore not
claim a right of residence in Germany under the CRD.
Therefore they cannot rely on the principle of non-dis-
crimination as put forward in the CRD and were denied
the social benefits in Germany. When compared to the
Martinez Sala judgment and the Trojani judgment, with
the Dano judgment it now seems necessary in order to
claim social assistance benefits on equal footing with
nationals under Article 18 TFEU and Article 24 CRD,
that the EU citizen must be lawfully resident under the
conditions of the CRD and not just solely on the basis of
the terms in national law. Also in the Alimanovic judg-
ment, the ECJ noted that with regard to access to social
benefits, the right to equal treatment can only be upheld
by EU citizens if the residence requirement in the host
Member State is in compliance with the CRD.17
Remarkable in the Alimanovic judgment is that the ECJ
does not mention EU citizenship or puts Article 20
TFEU into play. It seems that with the Alimanovic judg-
ment, an economically inactive EU citizen who does not
satisfy the conditions provided in the CRD, falls outside
the scope of Article 21 TFEU and cannot claim social
benefits on equal footing with nationals of the host
Member State.
On the other hand, in relation to the free movement
rights for economically active citizens, the ECJ’s case law
does not show that the application of the treaty rights is
affected by codification in the CRD. Exemplary, in this
regard, on the relation between the provisions of the
CRD and primary EU law are the joined cases of
Vatsouras and Koupatantze.18 The two cases concerned
Greek nationals who entered Germany in 2006 as job-
seekers. The German court (‘Sozialgericht Nürnberg’)
took the view that the Greek nationals were not entitled
to the basic job-seekers benefits they had been receiving
in Germany, since ‘brief minor’ professional activity of Mr
Vatsouras ‘did not ensure him a livelihood’ and the activity
pursued by Mr Koupatantze ‘lasted barely more than one
month’. According to Article 24 (2) CRD a Member State
is not obliged to confer entitlement to a social assistance
benefit on EU citizens who are not economically active.
The German court questioned whether Article 24 (2)
CRD was compatible with the principle of equal treat-
ment in Article 12 TEC (18 TFEU).
The ECJ first asked the German court to analyse the
status of the Greek nationals as ‘workers’. The ECJ
stated that nationals of a Member State seeking
employment in another Member State fall within the
scope of Article 39 TEC (Article 45 TFEU) and there-
fore enjoy the right to equal treatment to a benefit of a
financial nature intended to facilitate access to employ-
ment in the labour market of a Member State.19 A
Member State may, however, legitimately grant such
an allowance only to job-seekers who have a real link
with the labour market of that Member State. The
existence of such a link can be determined, in parti-
cular, by establishing that the person concerned has,
for a reasonable period, in fact genuinely sought work
that in relation to ‘outbound’ students, a three year residence
condition in German law in order to obtain a student loan is too
general and exclusive in relation to the determination of a genuine
link with Germany. Also in Case C-359/13 (Martens), the ECJ
found a three out of six year residence requirement for outbound
students too general and exclusive.
13 Spaventa, supra n. 2, at 208.
14 Ibid.
15 Case C-333/12 (Dano).
16 Art. 7 Directive 2004/38.
17 Case C-67/14 (Alimanovic).
18 Joined Cases C-22/08 (Vatsouras) and C-23/08 (Koupatantze).
19 Case C-258/04 (Ioannidis).
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in the host Member State. If the German court were to
conclude that Mr Vatsouras and Mr Koupatantze had
the status of workers, they would be entitled, in
accordance with Article 7 (3) (c) CRD, to receive the
requested benefits for at least six months after losing
their jobs.
The ECJ then goes on to examine the possibility of
refusing a social assistance benefit to job-seekers who do
not have the status of workers. In that regard the ECJ
noted that, in view of the establishment of EU citizen-
ship, job-seekers enjoy the right to equal treatment for
the purpose of claiming a benefit of a financial nature
intended to facilitate access to the labour market. The
ECJ states that EU citizens seeking employment in other
Member States are also workers under Article 45 TFEU
and that benefits designed to facilitate access to employ-
ment in the labour markets of those Member States must
consequently be protected under that article as well. The
derogation provided for in Article 24 (2) CRD must,
therefore, be interpreted in accordance with Article 39
(2) TEC (45 (2) TFEU). The ECJ therefore stated that
benefits of a financial nature which, independently of
their status under national law, are intended to facilitate
access to the labour market cannot be regarded as con-
stituting ‘social assistance’ within the meaning of Article
24 (2) CRD.
When comparing these two trends with regard to
the relationship between the provisions of the CRD
and primary EU law, it can be acknowledged that
the prime focus on the market citizen in the ECJ’s
case law is restated in comparison to the case law
on economically inactive EU citizens. With the
Alimanovic judgment, the ECJ makes the CRD
both ‘the floor and ceiling’20 of EU citizenship rights
and it tones down its earlier ‘fundamental status of
EU citizenship’ rhetoric in relation to the right to
social assistance in the host Member State for an
economically inactive EU citizen.
2.4 Period 4: The Conservative Phase in the
Development of EU Citizenship and the
Unclear ‘Substance Of Rights’ Test
The current period in the development of EU citizenship
can be viewed as a conservative phase which seems to
point to the recognition of the prime focus on the
nationality link of the EU citizen over any other status.
In order to fall within the scope of the Treaty, an EU
citizen needs to establish a cross-border link. The ECJ
has, however, noted that the absence of a cross-border
link does not have the automatic consequence that the
situation falls outside the scope of the TFEU. According
to the Garcia Avello judgment of the ECJ, a situation is
not purely internal if the contested national rule is cap-
able of imposing an obstacle on the EU citizen’s future
ability to move.21 While the ‘cross-border movement’-
requirement seems easy to fulfil with regard to the mar-
ket freedoms, this does not seem to be the case with
regard to EU citizenship.22 For instance, in the Lida
judgment, the ECJ found that the purely hypothetical
prospect that the right to move might be obstructed was
not enough to establish a sufficient link with EU law.23
In the Garcia Avello judgment, however, the ECJ found
the situation to fall within the scope EU law, despite the
fact that the claimants had not moved and were not
intending to do so in the near future. Both judgments
show that, with regard to EU citizenship, it is difficult to
determine the proximity between rule and obstacle for
the rule to fall within the scope of the TFEU.
A case is also not purely internal, if the rule affects the
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by
the EU citizenship provisions. According to the ECJ, this is
the case where the EU citizen would be deprived of her
nationality (Rottmann judgment) or where rules would
imply that an EU citizen has no choice but to leave the
territory of the EU (Zambrano judgment).24 In the
Zambrano judgment, the ECJ used the EU citizenship status
of the two minors to serve as a justification for an approach
which transcended the cross-border requirement. The ECJ
found that Article 20 TFEU precludes a Member State from
denying residence to the TCN parent of an EU citizen child,
notwithstanding that that EU citizen child had not exer-
cised his right of free movement within the EU, ‘in so far as
such decisions deprive those children of the genuine enjoyment
of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of European
Union citizen’. Therefore, the ECJ concluded that Mr
Zambrano could derive work and residence rights from
EU law. No cross-border element was required for EU
law to apply in this case.
The McCarthy judgment25 and Dereci judgment26
further defined the ‘substance of rights’ doctrine to excep-
tional cases in which the alternative of leaving the terri-
tory of the EU would be disproportionate. In the
McCarthy judgment, McCarthy, basically, was an adult,
and denial of access to her EU rights did not have the
same effect as a similar measure did on the Zambrano
children. The national decision did not oblige her to leave
20 Spaventa, supra n. 2, at 220.
21 This was the case in the Garcia Avello judgment, where Mr Garcia
Avello (Spanish national) and his wife (Belgian national), living in
Belgium, requested the Belgian authorities to change the surnames
of their children, in accordance with Spanish law, to the first
surname of the father followed by that of the mother. The ECJ
found that the situation was not wholly internal, as the children are
nationals of one Member State lawfully residing in the territory of
another Member State. The Belgian authorities could therefore not
refuse to treat the children as Spanish nationals with respect to
their application for a change of surname in the case where the
purpose of that application is to enable those children to bear the
surname to which they are entitled according to Spanish law. See
Case C-148/02 (Garcia Avello), at 26–28.
22 See for instance cases Gourmet (C-405/98) and Freskot (C-355/00).
23 Case C-40/11 (Lida), at 77.
24 Case C-135/08 (Rottmann) and Case C-34/09 (Zambrano).
25 Case C-434/09 (McCarthy).
26 Case C-256/11 (Dereci).
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the territory of the EU, as a negative decision would have
done in the Zambrano judgment.27 In the Dereci judg-
ment, the ECJ noted that the criterion relating to the
denial of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of EU
citizens’ rights refers to situations in which the EU citizen
has, in fact, to leave not only the territory of the Member
State of which (s)he is a national but also the territory of
the EU as a whole. It seems that the mere desirability of
keeping a family together is not enough, since expulsion
of the TCN from the EU in this situation will not inevi-
tably force the EU citizen to leave too.
The precise scope of what is exactly meant by ‘genuine
enjoyment of the substance of rights of EU citizens’ is not
clear and therefore problematic. First, the ECJ’s test has a
speculative element consisting of presumptions about
family structures and personal affiliation with regard to
the question if the child has no choice but to leave the
territory of the Member State. Is it relevant for the ECJ
which of the parents is going to be deported and should
EU law have something to say about the priority of
parental ties?28 Furthermore, the open nature of the
substance of rights test is problematic, because it’s diffi-
cult to know which of the rights granted by the EU
treaties are considered the ‘core’ rights. Is it only free
movement rights? The free movement rights and the
residence rights? The free movement rights or the resi-
dence rights? And what about the right not to be dis-
criminated against or the right to vote in the European
Parliament elections? And what is exactly the standard
proof required for cases in which an EU citizen has to
leave the territory of the EU under this doctrine?29
In this regard the Alokpa judgment is relevant.30 The
case concerned a Togolese national who came to
Luxembourg, where she gave birth to twins. After
their birth, a French national, recognized paternity of
the twins. As a result, the twins became French
nationals and were issued French passports and identity
cards. No contact was maintained with the father.
Mother and sons lived together in Luxembourg as a
family in a hostel and were dependent on the State.
The mother was offered a job for an indefinite period in
Luxembourg, but her lack of residence and work permit
impeded her from working. When the mother’s appli-
cation for a residence permit as a family member of two
EU citizens was rejected, the authorities reasoned that
the children could easily receive their necessary medical
treatment in France. The ECJ found that if Article 21
TFEU did not preclude a refusal of a right of residence,
in exceptional circumstances, Article 20 TFEU could
grant a right of residence if the effectiveness of the EU
citizenship – status of the children were otherwise to be
undermined. The ECJ concluded, that being forced to
leave Luxembourg would not result in an obligation to
leave the whole territory of the EU, as the children were
French nationals. The mother therefore has the right to
reside in France as the sole caregiver of minors. And
therefore, the refusal by the Luxembourg authorities
does not constitute a deprivation of the genuine of
enjoyment of the twins’ EU rights. This is the case
even though the mother and the twins had no links,
family or friends, in France. The Zambrano judgment
and Alokpa judgment show that it is very difficult to
take the ‘substance of rights’- doctrine seriously. How
can, as in the Zambrano judgment, the hypothetical
prospect of leaving the EU territory affect the substance
of the rights of citizenship, but, as in the Alokpa judg-
ment, the denial of any possibility to reside in a state
other than that of nationality leave the substance of
those same rights in tact?31
The end result of the Zambrano judgment and the
Alokpa judgment is to grant the responsibility of the EU
citizen firmly to the state of nationality; even where an
individual assessment should have led the ECJ to the
conclusion that the twins in the Alokpa case had
formed a real link with their host state (Luxembourg)
and had no link with their state of nationality (France).
This case law shows that the ECJ is privileging the
abstract notion of belonging based on allocation by
birth at the expense of the supra-national notion of
belonging by choice; so favoured in its earlier case
law. The ECJ has chosen for a narrower interpretation
of EU citizenship rights which seems to point to the
recognition of the centrality of the nationality link over
any other status; thereby indicating that it sees EU
citizenship, at this moment, as a mere and minor status
in addition to national citizenship rather than a true
supranational status. A perception, reflecting the
change in public appetite for EU citizenship.
27 For a discussion of the Zambrano judgment and the McCarthy
judgment, I refer to A. P. van der Mei, S. C. G. Bogaert & G. R.
de Groot, De arresten Ruiz Zambrano en McCarthy, (6) Nederlands
tijdschrift voor Europees recht 188–199 (2011).
28 The Zambrano judgment was reaffirmed and expanded in the
Chavez-Vilchez judgment (C-133/15) in which was stated that Art.
20 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that for the purposes of
assessing whether a child who is a citizen of the European Union
would be compelled to leave the territory of the European Union as
a whole and thereby deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the
substance of the rights conferred on him by that article if the child’s
third-country national parent were refused a right of residence in
the Member State concerned, the fact that the other parent, who is
a Union citizen, is actually able and willing to assume sole respon-
sibility for the primary day-to-day care of the child is a relevant
factor, but it is not in itself a sufficient ground for a conclusion that
there is not, between the third-country national parent and the
child, such a relationship of dependency that the child would
indeed be so compelled were there to be such a refusal of a right
of residence. Such an assessment must take into account, in the
best interests of the child concerned, all the specific circumstances,
including the age of the child, the child’s physical and emotional
development, the extent of his emotional ties both to the Union
citizen parent and to the third-country national parent, and the
risks which separation from the latter might entail for the child’s
equilibrium.
29 See Spaventa, supra n. 2, at 209–214.
30 Case C-86/12 (Alokpa). 31 See Spaventa, supra n. 2, at 215.
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3 EU CITIZENSHIP AND FREE MOVEMENT OF
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE PERSONS
3.1 Introduction
The previous section showed that the ECJ chose for a
more conservative interpretation of EU citizenship rights
in the current stage of the development of these rights.
This section focuses on the relationship between EU
citizenship and the free movement provisions for eco-
nomically active persons, in order to find out what the
impact of EU citizenship has been on the interpretation
of these market freedoms.32 Section 3.2 discusses how
the market freedoms, prior to the introduction of EU
citizenship, appeared to be interpreted as merely tools
for the construction of the internal market. Section 3.3
examines the overall impact of EU citizenship on the
interpretation of the market freedoms after the Treaty
of Maastricht.
It is argued that the ECJ’s post-Maastricht case law on
the market freedoms cannot be explained under a purely
internal market rationale. The ECJ’s case law demon-
strates that these market freedoms developed from
instrumental freedoms for the purpose of contributing
to the economic aims of the Treaty to sources of funda-
mental economic rights for EU citizens. The beneficiaries
of these market freedoms can be EU citizens who should
now enjoy certain economic rights simply because they
are EU citizens and not merely for contributing to the
economic aims of the Treaty.33
3.2 The Interpretation of the Market Freedoms
Prior to the Introduction of EU Citizenship34
Advocates of the non-discrimination model argue that
the internal market should be construed by allowing
goods and persons to move freely within the EU. The
effect of the non-discrimination model is to see to it that
imported goods and migrants satisfy the rules laid down
by the host Member State, provided that those rules
apply equally to domestic goods and persons. Free
movement of goods and persons within the EU can on
the other hand only be reached if domestic and foreign
goods and persons are treated equally both in form and
substance; implying that both domestic and foreign
goods and persons should only be subjected to one set
of regulatory standards. This is called the principle of
mutual recognition, as explained by the ECJ in the Cassis
de Dijon judgment.35
Advocates of the non-discrimination model also argue
that the TFEU is only concerned with equal treatment
and the elimination of protectionism. As a result, the
judicial scrutiny of the ECJ should only extend to nega-
tive integration, by ensuring that national laws do not
subject foreign goods and persons to more than one set
of regulatory standards. In this view, the ECJ would go
beyond the basis provided for in the TFEU and it would
intervene with national regulatory policies, not related to
free movement within the EU, if it also curtails non-
discriminatory national measures.36 Other commentators
argue that the rationale behind the internal market and
free movement is to allow economic operators the right
to pursue an economic activity in another Member State
or even in one’s own country. In that regard, it is argued
in literature that a broader market access test should be
applied which should result in the unlawfulness of
national rules hindering or preventing market access,
regardless of whether they discriminate against imported
goods or migrants.37
As from the mid-1990s, the ECJ started to change its
perspective on what constitutes an impediment to inter
Member State movement with regard to the treaty provi-
sions on the free movement of economically active per-
sons from a non-discrimination approach to a broader
market access approach. The ECJ broadened the free
movement of economically active persons provisions to
not only include directly and indirectly discriminatory
restrictions, but also any national rule which hinders or
otherwise makes free movement between Member States
less attractive. This was first seen in the Säger judgment,
concerning the freedom to provide services. The ECJ
stated:
Article (49 TEC) requires not only the elimination of all dis-
crimination against a person providing services on the ground of
his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it
applies without distinction to national providers of services and
32 When the term market freedoms is mentioned, reference is made to
the free movement of workers (Art. 45 TFEU), the freedom of
establishment (Art. 49 TFEU) and the freedom to provide services
(56 TFEU).
33 On this subject, see A. Tryfonidou, The Impact of Union Citizenship
on the EU’s Market Freedoms (Hart Publishing 2016), Part II. Here
(at 65) also mention is made that the constitutionalization of the
market freedoms was (implicitly) required by the Treaties and the
broader non-economic aims, which had been set for European
integration from the very beginning. The re-reading of the market
freedoms, which goes back to the 1960s, can be seen as one of the
tools used for furthering the main aim of the EU, which has always
been to achieve peace in Europe and a better life for all; the
ultimate goal of the EU which, was hidden by the subsequent
pragmatic stress on economic goals. However, the introduction of
EU citizenship has been immensely important in the process of
constitutionalizing the market freedoms and without it the trans-
formation of these provisions into sources of fundamental rights,
would probably not have taken place.
34 Para. 3.2.1 is an abstract of Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 9, parts 9.1 and
9.3.
35 Case 120/78 (Cassis de Dijon).
36 For instance, N. Bernard, Discrimination and Free Movement in EC
Law, 45 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 82 (1996) and G. Davies, Nationality
Discrimination in the European Internal Market (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International 2003).
37 C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, The Four Freedoms 18–25
(4th ed., Oxford University Press 2013). Advocates of this view are
A-G Jacobs in his Opinion of 24 Nov. 1994 in Case C-412/93
(Leclerc-Siplec); S. Weatherill, After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to
Clarify the Clarification, 33 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 885 (1996); C.
Barnard, Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons
Jigsaw, 26 Eur. L. Rev. 35 (2001).
EU CITIZENSHIP AND DIRECT TAXATION
152 EC TAX REVIEW 2018/3
to those of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or
otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services estab-
lished in another Member State where he lawfully provides
similar services.38
This view was followed in the Alpine judgment, another
case relating to the freedom to provide services, where
the ECJ found that the Dutch provisions on cold calling
were within the ambit of Article 49 TEC (56 TFEU),
because they ‘directly affected access to the market in other
Member States’.39 Also in the Schindler judgment, again
relating to the freedom to provide services, the ECJ held
that a general lottery prohibition which applies without
distinction to both foreign and national operators, but
which is ‘liable to prohibit or otherwise impede’ the
provision of services by an operator established in
another Member State may also be caught by the free
treaty provision on services.40 In the Bosman judgment
the ECJ stated that the transfer system at issue directly
affected football ‘players’ access to the employment market
in another Member State’.41
The general conclusion is that, prior to the introduc-
tion of EU citizenship, the aim of the market freedoms
has been to enable Member State nationals to take up
economic activities in another Member State to be per-
manently pursued there or in a cross border context. The
market freedoms were instrumental to the realization of
the economic aims of the treaty. It appeared that the
market freedoms were interpreted as merely tools for the
construction of the internal market and were not yet also
seen as fundamental economic rights for EU citizens.
3.3. The Impact of EU Citizenship on the Market
Freedoms
3.3.1 Introduction
The ECJ’s pre-Maastricht case law shows that the market
freedoms were interpreted as tools for the realization of
the internal market. Following the introduction of EU
citizenship, the ECJ extended the scope of the market
freedoms beyond its initial economic aims. An explicit
recognition to interpret the market freedoms in light of
EU citizenship, is found in the Collins judgment. In the
Collins judgment, the ECJ for the first time had to
address the question whether a Member State national
seeking a job in another Member State could ask for a
social benefit in the host Member State.42 Mr Collins
situation was only covered by Article 39 TEC (Article
45 TFEU).43 Based on the Lebon judgment,44 this did not
help Mr Collins. The expansion of Article 39 TEC
(Article 45 TFEU) to job seekers initially only entailed
equal rights to access to employment and did not cover
equal access to financial benefits. However, the ECJ
explicitly used the introduction on EU citizenship to
interpret Article 39 TEC (Article 45 TFEU) in the more
general light of equal treatment of EU citizens. The ECJ
stated that in view of the establishment of citizenship of the
Union and the interpretation in the case-law of the right to
equal treatment enjoyed by citizens of the Union, it is no
longer possible to exclude from the scope of the free
movement of workers a benefit of a financial nature
intended to facilitate access to employment in the labour
market of a Member State.45 In the Collins judgment, the
ECJ overruled its earlier case law, under which the right
to equal treatment for job seekers only related to the
access to employment in the labour market of the host
Member State. Prior to the Collins judgment, the expan-
sion of the free movement right for workers to job
seekers did not entail the right to financial benefits in
the host Member State.46
Other ways in which the influence of EU citizenship
on the market freedoms can be recognized, relate to the
application of the market freedoms to situations that
would not fall under the scope of the market freedoms
under a purely instrumental reading (‘treaty access’), the
elimination of the requirement of a cross-border specifi-
city of a national measure in order to fall under the
scrutiny of the market freedoms and the unsatisfactory
market access test as an explanation for the broad scope
of the market freedoms. These developments will be
discussed in the remainder of this section.
3.3.2 EU Citizenship and Treaty Access
In order to distinguish between the interpretation of the
market freedoms before and after the introduction of EU
citizenship, first a basic description is given of situations
that were excluded from the scope of application of the
market freedoms, but would be included under its scope
after the introduction of EU citizenship. Second, ECJ
case law is discussed in which situations were brought
38 Case C-76/90 (Säger), at 12.
39 Case C-384/93 (Alpine), at 38.
40 Case C-275/92 (Schindler), at 43–45.
41 Case C-415/93 (Bosman), at 103.
42 Case C-138/02 (Collins).
43 Case C-138/02 (Collins), at 43.
44 Case 316/85 (Lebon).
45 Case C-138/02 (Collins), at 63. Exactly the same reasoning was
applied in the Ioannidis judgment (C-258/04, at 22) and in the
Vatsouras and Koupatantze judgments (C-22&23/08, at 37). One
month after the Collins judgment, the ECJ addressed the effect that
the introduction of EU citizenship has had on the interpretation of
the derogations of the market freedoms in its Orfanopoulos and
Oliveri judgment (joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01).The ECJ
held that a particularly restrictive interpretation of the derogations
from the freedom of movement for workers is required by virtue of
a person’s status as a citizen of the Union (at 65 & 79). The ECJ
found that national legislation that required the automatic expul-
sion of nationals of other Member States, who had received certain
sentences for specific offences, was not justified on the grounds of
public policy. Also the same derogation precluded a national prac-
tice which did not take into consideration, in reviewing the law-
fulness of the expulsion of a national of another Member State,
factual matters and a positive development in that person which
occurred after the final decision of the competent authorities.
46 Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 11, part 3.3.
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under the scope of application of the market freedoms
that would be excluded under a purely internal market
rationale of these market freedoms.
A situation was brought under the free movement of
workers and the freedom of establishment if a person
exercised an inter Member State movement in order to
take up an economic activity as a worker or self-
employed person in the host Member State and (s)he is
unjustifiably restricted in doing so.47 The ECJ found that
these criteria were cumulative and needed to be con-
nected. The free movement of workers and the freedom
of establishment involved taking up an economic activity
in another Member State, thereby requiring a change in
the location of the economic activity and the economic
base of the economic actor.48
This was illustrated in the Werner judgment.49 The
most important question raised in this case, was whether
Mr Werner had access to the eec Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community (TFEU). The sole intra
Community aspect of this case was the fact that Mr
Werner had moved his residence to another Member
State. This did not constitute an economic intra-
Community movement covered by the TEC (TFEU), as
was required by the ECJ’s instrumental reading of the
market freedoms. The ECJ found that there was no factor
connecting Mr Werner’s situation to Community law. The
ECJ stated that Article 43 TEC (Article 49 TFEU) does not
preclude a Member State from imposing on its nationals,
who carry on their professional activities within its terri-
tory and who earn all or almost all of their income there
or possess all or almost all of their assets there, a heavier
tax burden if they do not reside in that Member State than
if they do. The Werner judgment showed that if a national
of a Member State does not participate in an inter Member
State movement in order to take up an economic activity
as a worker or self-employed person in the host Member
State, under a purely instrumental reading, the free move-
ment of workers and the freedom of establishment do not
apply and lead to reverse discrimination that cannot be
solved under these freedoms.50
However, the ECJ’s case law after the introduction of
EU citizenship now seems to have abandoned the
requirement of a change of the economic base of the
economic actor and/or the location of the economic
activity for the application of the market freedoms. All
market freedoms now also appear to be sources of a
primary right to pursue an economic activity in a
cross-border context, even where there is no change in
the economic base of the economic actor and/or in the
place of the economic activity.51 This view can be
acknowledged in the Ritter-Coulais judgment.52 Mr and
Mrs Ritter-Coulais are German nationals and work as
secondary school teachers in Germany. Mr and Mrs
Ritter-Coulais were jointly assessed in Germany as per-
sons liable to income tax on their total income. Mrs
Ritter-Coulais also has French nationality. They live in
a private dwelling in France. Mr and Mrs Ritter-Coulais
requested the German tax authorities to take the negative
income from the use of their house as a dwelling into
account for the purpose of determining the rate for their
German tax liability in 1987.
A sufficient intra-EU situation must be acknowledged
in order to bring this case within the ambit of EU law.
The facts of the Ritter-Coulais case have to be analysed
from the perspective of the German authorities. The facts
in the Ritter-Coulais case concerned German tax legisla-
tion and from that perspective the Ritter-Coulais couple
earned their family income in Germany and only moved
to France to return to their residence. During the facts of
the Ritter-Coulais case, the free movement of persons
was only seen from an intra-EU economic perspective and
from that view the case should fall outside the scope of
the market freedoms as the only cross-border element
concerned the change of residence. The ECJ, however,
took the view that any EU national who, irrespective of his
place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right
to freedom of movement for workers and who has been
employed in a Member State other than that of residence
falls within the scope of article 48 TEC (Article 45 TFEU).53
The ECJ overturned its Werner judgment, by accepting
that only the change of residence to another Member
State from the Member State of employment is sufficient
to fall within the ambit of the market freedoms.
The ECJ extended its line of reasoning in the Ritter-
Coulais judgment to the context of the freedom of estab-
lishment in the N judgment.54 The ECJ stated that resi-
dence in another Member State can be sufficient to rely
on the economic EU freedoms, even if that residence is
not necessarily connected to an economic activity in
another Member State. The ECJ found that a resident
of one of the Member States who has a 100% share-
holding in a company, established in another Member
State, is sufficient to rely on the right of establishment.
47 Frontier workers have also been included within the scope of the
free movement of workers and the freedom of establishment,
because, whilst they have maintained their residence, their situation
does include the initiation of an economic activity in another
Member State.
48 Tryfonidou, supra n. 33, at 76–79. In this regard, a distinction
should also be made between, one the one hand, the freedom to
provide services and, on the other hand, the free movement of
workers and the freedom of establishment. The freedom to provide
services ensures that while the economic base of the economic actor
remains the same, the location of the economic activity changes
temporarily (the service provider moves to another Member State to
provide services), or the mode of pursuit of the economic activity
changes (the service initially being provided in a purely domestic
situation to being provided across borders). See for instance, the
Koestler judgment (Case 15/78).
49 Case C-112/91 (Werner).
50 Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 10, part 4.
51 Tryfonidou, supra n. 33, at 88. This was already the case with
regard to the freedom to provide services. See fn. 16.
52 Case C-152/03 (Ritter-Coulais).
53 Case C-152/03 (Ritter-Coulais), at 31. This perspective was also
confirmed in the later Renneberg judgment (C-527/06).
54 Case C-470/04 (N).
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The ECJ expressly stated that the contested Dutch legis-
lation was capable of discouraging Mr N from transfer-
ring his residence outside The Netherlands and that a
taxpayer wishing to transfer his residence outside The
Netherlands, is an aspect of the exercise of the rights
guaranteed to him by Article 43 TEC (49 TFEU). This
view was again confirmed in the later Geurts judgment
where the ECJ decided that in a case of a sole share-
holder of two Dutch companies who only transferred his
residence, Article 43 TEC (49 TFEU) was applicable for
determining if the refusal of the Belgian tax authorities to
grant Mr Vogten’s heirs the benefit of an exemption
provided under Belgian law, which required that the
family undertaking in which the shares are held has to
employ at least five employees in the Flemish Region
during the three years preceding the deceased’s death,
was contrary to EU law.55
The discussed case law demonstrates that the ECJ has
accepted that the scope of the market freedoms now
include any economically active EU citizen in a cross-
border situation, even though the cross border move-
ment is not connected to taking up an economic activity
in the host Member State.56
3.3.3 EU Citizenship and the Abandonment of the
Requirement of Cross-Border Specificity of a
National Rule
As already mentioned, under a purely instrumental read-
ing, the market freedoms were merely seen as tools for
building the internal market. Under the market free-
doms, the internal market is mainly built through nega-
tive harmonization. This implies that the main regulatory
responsibility stays with the Member States and the EU
should not interfere when Member States regulate an
economic activity in a neutral manner. Only national
measures that lead to cross-border situations being trea-
ted less favourable than purely national situations should
be caught by the market freedoms.57 Genuinely non-
discriminatory national measures imposed by the host
Member State, therefore, are incapable of impeding the
taking up of an economic activity in the territory of that
Member State by nationals of other Member States more
than they can of its own nationals. Hence, under a purely
instrumental approach of the interpretation of the mar-
ket freedoms, genuinely non-discriminatory national
measures have no cross-border specificity and therefore
fall outside the scope of the market freedoms; even if
they limit the freedom of economic actors altogether.58
However, the ECJ seems to have broadened the scope of
the market freedoms by also catching national measures
that do not have a cross-border specificity and limit the
freedom of economic actors in a neutral manner.
In the Schindler judgment, the ECJ held that a general
lottery prohibition in the UK which applies without
distinction to both foreign and national operators, a
genuinely non-discriminatory national measure, was
caught by the freedom to provide services.59 Another
important judgment relating to the scope of the market
freedoms is the Gebhard judgment.60 The rules in the
Gebhard case concerned the required registration of
lawyers with the Italian bar in order to use the title
avvocato. The rules at issue were not to the particular
detriment of migrants. The rules affected Mr Gebhard to
the same degree as Italian lawyers. By allowing Mr
Gebhard to question those rules under a necessity and
proportionality assessment, the ECJ dissolves the line
between the national rule at issue and the specific effect
on free movement of that national rule. It seems that the
intra-EU specificity of a national rule, which is the case
when there is a double burden or a cross border issue, is
no longer relevant to bring the national rule under the
scope of EU law. The Italian registration requirement
formed the barrier to Mr Gebhard’s freedom of establish-
ment. After the Gebhard judgment it seems that any
national rule which merely regulates an economic activ-
ity can be brought under EU law, even though there is
no intra-EU specificity.
This view is also supported by the Gourmet judgment.
In the Gourmet judgment the claimant was a company
which published a magazine.61 The company was estab-
lished in Sweden. In one of the issues of the magazine,
three pages for advertisement for alcohol beverages were
placed. That placement was in breach of the almost total
ban on alcohol advertising, imposed by Swedish legisla-
tion. The ECJ found this case to be covered by Article 49
TEC (56 TFEU), despite the fact that the rules at issue
prevented the existence of the national Swedish advertis-
ing market for alcoholic beverages altogether. The barrier
arises from the very existence of national rules.62 The
only intra-community element was the possibility that
some of the clients of the Swedish company might be
established in another Member State. The approach in
the Gourmet judgment signals a considerable expansion
of the scope of Article 49 TEC (56 TFEU), because the
Swedish company was challenging the very illegality of
the provision of services in its Member State of establish-
ment, which was the only regulator. Also the intra-com-
munity element was weak due to the fact that the
presence of a foreign service recipient was an incidental
matter.63
55 Case C-464/05 (Geurts).
56 For a discussion of these cases, see Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 12.
57 Opinion of A-G Poiares Maduro in joined Cases C-158 & 159/04
(Vassilopoulos), at 41.
58 Tryfonidou, supra n. 33, at 91–95.
59 Case C-275/92 (Schindler), at 43–45.
60 Case C-55/94 (Gebhard).
61 Case C-405/98 (Gourmet).
62 Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 9.
63 E. Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union,
Barriers to Movement in their Constitutional Context 46–47 (The
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2007).
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3.3.4 EU Citizenship and Market Access64
It is also questionable if the broad market access
approach is the only concept underlying the ECJ’s
judgments. For instance, the Gourmet judgment cannot
be put in line with a market access analysis, because
the Swedish advertising rules on alcohol restricted the
existence of alcohol advertisement in Sweden alto-
gether and did not have an impact on access to the
market of another Member State.65 Also, in the Freskot
judgment, the ECJ found that a person was allowed to
challenge the rules of its Member State of establish-
ment on purely hypothetical grounds, whereas that
person might have wanted to insure the risk and
might have chosen a provider from another Member
State, if Greece had not imposed the compulsory
insurance at issue.66 In the Carpenter judgment, relat-
ing to deportation rules for those who overstayed their
welcome, cannot be put in line even with the broadest
notion of market access.67 The alleged obstacle in the
Gebhard judgment arose from the very existence of
rules in the host Member State and it was of no
relevance to the ECJ if Germany had the same rules
as Italy.
The question rises if the market access test can
explain the Gebhard judgment and provide clarity as
to the scope of the market freedoms. After the Gebhard
judgment it seems that any national rule which merely
regulates an economic activity can be brought under
EU law, even though there is no double regulatory
burden or intra-EU specificity. This view is also sup-
ported by the Gourmet judgment and the Freskot judg-
ment, where the facts of the cases were brought within
the ambit of EU law, based on hypothetical grounds or
despite the fact that the rules at issue did not have a
specific cross-border effect. As mentioned, the rules in
the Gourmet judgment did not prevent access to a
foreign market; they only prevented the existence of
the national Swedish market.
The ECJ’s case law indicates that non-discrimination
and market access are not the only underlying rationale
of the market freedoms anymore. Spaventa notes that
the underlying rationale of this case law is that those
who have exercised their right to move should not be
subject to unnecessary regulation, to a disproportionate
interference with their right to pursue an economic
activity. Spaventa acknowledges that her view is not
helpful in drawing the outer boundaries of the market
freedoms and does not differ substantially from the
market access test. However, she stipulates that her
view is useful in that it explains the case law of the
ECJ more accurate, because the market access test does
not give guidance as to what constitutes a barrier to
movement or why such barriers fall within the scope of
the free movement provisions. Spaventa’s view high-
lights the fact that the free movement provisions have
evolved into a broader right which resembles familiar
rights known in constitutional law, the right not to be
hindered in the pursuit of an economic activity without
good reason. She suggests that the scope of ‘free move-
ment’ should include the right to exercise an economic
activity in a cross border context, rather than a broad
right to market access. The Gebhard judgment, Gourmet
judgment and Freskot judgment can be viewed in this
light. In this perspective, the free movement provisions
can be seen as a weapon to challenge regulatory beha-
viour of the Member States.68
3.3.5 Free Movement: From an Instrumental Right to a
Fundamental Right?
The discussed case law shows that the market freedoms
are now sources of two rights; the right to take up an
economic activity in another Member State and the right
to start pursuing an economic activity in a cross-border
context. The right to take up an economic activity in
another Member State can be fully justified on an instru-
mental reading of the market freedoms, because this is
what is necessary in order for an internal market to be
built, as workers and entrepreneurs can work in any other
Member State they wish. Under an instrumental reading,
the market freedoms are seen as tools for the realization
of the internal market.
However, the internal market rationale cannot explain
the second right originating from the market freedoms.
By expanding the scope of the market freedoms to also
entail the right to start pursuing an economic activity in a
cross-border context, the ECJ has pushed the scope of
the market freedoms beyond their initial economic aim
(building an internal market). As Tryfonidou notes; does
the ability of Member States nationals to choose where to
live in the EU, while continuing to pursue an economic
activity permanently in their home state, contribute in
any way to building an internal market by removing
obstacles to the initiation of an economic activity in
another Member State? The answer is clearly ‘no’.69
The market freedoms are no longer merely sources of
the right to take up and then pursue an economic
activity in another Member State in a cross-border con-
text under the same conditions as are imposed under
purely internal situations. The requirement of a cross
border specificity was an important aspect of the ECJ’s
instrumental interpretation of the market freedoms,
because it served as a tool to only scrutinize those
national rules which did not regulate an economic activ-
ity in a neutral manner. The abandonment of the
requirement of cross-border specificity of a national
64 This paragraph is an abstract of Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 9, para. 5.
65 Case C-405/98 (Gourmet).
66 Case C-355/00 (Freskot). See Spaventa, supra n. 63, at 48.
67 Case C-60/00 (Carpenter).
68 Spaventa, supra n. 63, at Ch. 5.
69 Tryfonidou, supra n. 33, at 110–113.
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rule has as a consequence that it catches national mea-
sures that do not have a cross-border specificity and limit
the freedom of economic actors in a neutral manner. The
market freedoms are now seen as sources of a broader
right, implying that those who have exercised their right
to move should not be subject to unnecessary regulation,
to a disproportionate interference with their right to
pursue an economic activity.70 As Spaventa notes, these
cases represent not only a step towards a considerable
expansion of the scope of the free movement provisions, but
also a qualitative leap in the content of the free movement
right. Thus, if previously the Court’s interpretation of the
persons’ provisions was instrumental – or could be so
explained and justified – to the achievement of the internal
market, the move towards a non-discriminatory assessment
adds a new dimension to the rights conferred upon indivi-
duals by the community.71 The ECJ’s case law indicates
that non-discrimination and market access are not the
only underlying rationale for bringing national measures
under the scope of the market freedoms anymore.
Article 20 (2) TFEU states that ‘(c)itizens of the Union
shall enjoy the rights and be subject to duties provided for in
the Treaties’. It seems that this suggests that since the
introduction of EU citizenship in 1993, the market free-
doms should be re-read as part of a package of rights
that the EU seeks to provide its citizens.72 As A-G
Poiares Maduro points out: ‘It is important that the free-
doms of movement fit into a broader framework of the
objectives of the internal market and European citizenship.
At present, the freedoms of movement must be understood to
be one of the essential elements of the fundamental status of
nationals of the Member States’.73 The internal market
should now also be seen as an area in which EU citizens
can freely exercise their fundamental rights they derive
from the EU treaties as EU citizens and not only as
economic operators. As Spaventa puts it:
(n)ot only Europe has progressed towards an integrated econ-
omy, but the European project has evolved to create a new
constitutional dimension which ‘puts the individual at the heart
of its activities’. The Union citizen is then not merely instru-
mental to the economic welfare of the Community – rather, she
achieves an additional status, and with that, an additional layer
of fundamental rights protection.74
In this context Tryfonidou argues that the market free-
doms, when invoked by EU citizens, should be read
together with the provisions on EU citizenship.75
An explanation for this broad interpretation of the
market freedoms by the ECJ, therefore, can be found in
the view that the ECJ is in the process of
reconceptualizing the market freedoms as part of a
broader EU citizenship right for all economically active
EU citizens; the right to pursue an economic activity in a
cross border context, irrespective of whether the eco-
nomically active EU citizen contributes to the aims of
the internal market. For instance, this preference
towards the individual explains the case law, where
there is no issue of barrier to movement. The normative
treaty justification of the free movement of persons as to
encompass the right to pursue an economic activity in a
cross border context can be found in the introduction of
EU citizenship.76 In this view, the market freedoms are
no longer instrumental rights, but are rights granted to
EU citizens for their owns sake and can, therefore, be
considered as fundamental economic rights.
4 THE SCHUMACKER CASE LAW: THE ‘ALWAYS
SOMEWHERE’ APPROACH AS PART OF AN
ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
The Schumacker judgment concerned a Belgian resident
who has always lived in Belgium with his wife and
children. After first working in Belgium, he was
employed in Germany where he earned the entire family
income.77 The Double Tax Convention between Belgium
and Germany concluded that Germany was appointed
the right to tax Mr Schumacker’s wages. The family
income was entirely exempted from taxation in
Belgium. Because of his Belgian residence, Mr
Schumacker was subjected to a limited tax liability in
Germany, therefore denying him several tax advantages.
Mr Schumacker was denied personal allowances in
Germany, especially the income tax regime allowing
couples to benefit from a lower progression (‘splitting
regime’). The splitting regime was only granted to
German residents. Essentially, the ECJ had to address
the question if the denial of the tax advantages to Mr
Schumacker was contrary to the free movement of
workers.
The ECJ stated in this regard that in the field of direct
taxation residents and non-residents are not in a com-
parable situation, because normally the major part of the
income is concentrated in the Member State of residence
and, according to international tax law, the personal and
family circumstances therefore have to be taken into
account in that state, because the state of residence has
the information available to assess the taxpayer’s overall
ability to pay tax and taxes the taxpayer’s total ability to
pay tax. Belgium should take Mr Schumacker’s personal
and family circumstances into account. However, the
ECJ made an exemption in the Schumacker judgment to
the distinction between residents and non-residents. The
ECJ acknowledged that a non-resident who undertakes
70 Ibid., at 100.
71 Spaventa, supra n. 63, at 101.
72 Tryfonidou, supra n. 33, at 168.
73 Opinion of A-G Poiares Maduro in joined Cases C-158/04 and 159/
04, para. 40.
74 Spaventa, supra n. 63, at xv.
75 Tryfonidou, supra n. 33, at 168–169.
76 Spaventa, supra n. 63, at Ch. 5.
77 Case 279/93 (Schumacker).
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significant economic activity in a Member State and
derives his income entirely or almost entirely from the
economic activity, is deemed to be comparable with
resident taxpayers. Therefore, Mr Schumacker could
rely on Article 39 TEC (Article 45 TFEU) in order to
take his personal and family circumstances into account
on the same footing as German residents, when addres-
sing his tax position in Germany.78
The Schumacker doctrine was further specified in
various judgments and the personal and family cir-
cumstances were extended to ‘all the tax advantages
connected with the non-resident’s ability to pay tax’.79 It
is not exactly clear under which conditions the ECJ
finds that these circumstances have to be taken into
account by the source Member State in case the
Member State of residence is not in a position to do
so. It seems that the ECJ requires equal treatment of
non-residents by the source Member State in case ‘all
or almost all income’ is derived there (quantitative
requirement) but at the same time in the Commission
v. Estonia judgment80 the ECJ finds that even a non-
resident who earns 50% of his income in the source
Member State and who could not effectively benefit
from the personal tax allowances in the Member State
of residence, should be granted the same personal tax
allowances as residents in the source Member State,
implying, in my view, an ‘always somewhere’ approach
with regard to taking account of the personal and
family circumstances (qualitative requirement). The
ECJ seems to have relaxed its quantitative requirement
in the Kieback judgment81 from ‘all or almost all
income’ to the ‘major part of the income’; without
exactly defining what constitutes a ‘major part’.82
In the X judgment, the ECJ had to decide in a case
where in the Member State of residence no taxable
income was earned to take account of the personal and
family circumstances of a resident taxpayer and in
neither source Member States the quantitative require-
ment of earning ‘all or almost all’ (‘major part’?) the
income was met.83 The case concerned a Dutch national,
residing in Spain with only negative income from an
owner occupied dwelling in Spain. The Dutch national
received his positive income from the Netherlands (60%)
and Switzerland (Non-EU; 40%). The Dutch national did
not earn ‘all or almost’ all his income in the Netherland or
Switzerland and neither had positive income in Spain to
set off the negative income from his owner occupied
dwelling there; implying that his personal and family
circumstances would not be taken into account
anywhere.84 The ECJ ruled that since the non-resident
taxpayer could not claim deductions for personal and
family circumstances in his Member State of residence (i.
e. Spain), because he was not receiving income there, the
Member State of activity must permit a proportionate
deduction of the negative income relating to a dwelling
in the Member State of residence. The non-resident
taxpayer may claim a deduction in proportion to the
share of income received in each Member State of activ-
ity (in this case 60% in the Netherlands). The X judg-
ment stipulates that it is not decisive whether the
taxpayer earns all or almost all his income in one
Member State but rather if the Member State of residence
is not in a position to take into account his personal and
family situation. In that case it is the Member States of
activity that should take into account the personal and
family situation of the taxpayer proportionally.85
However, the discussed case law on the market free-
doms in previous sections indicated that the ECJ is in the
process of reconceptualizing the market freedoms as part
of a broader right for all economically active EU citizens
to pursue an economic activity in a cross-border context,
rather than to only protect the instrumental right to
move between Member States for the purpose of taking
up or pursuing an economic activity. In this regard, after
the X judgment, the question arises whether or not, in a
comparable situation, a Dutch national would only be
able to take into account the personal and family situa-
tion proportionally in The Netherlands if (s)he would
have claimed before the ECJ that (s)he could not set off
the negative income from the owner occupied dwelling
in Spain against income earned in other states. Based
under an ‘always somewhere’ approach an EU citizen
would be discouraged from the pursuit of an economic
activity in a cross-border context in case his personal and
family circumstances would not be taken into account
somewhere. In case the ECJ were to uphold this view, it
would mean that the negative income from an owner
occupied dwelling in Spain can be set off in total against
the 60% positive income in The Netherlands.
New ‘Schumacker case law’ will have to point out if
the ECJ is willing to uphold its economic fundamental
right reading of the market freedoms in the area of direct
taxation and consequently address citizens as citizens,
rather than as market actors; at the expense of Member
State tax autonomy. If this is the case, than the ECJ is
moving on a slippery slope with its case law. It is not for
the ECJ to determine which circumstances affect a
78 Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 12, 232–234.
79 Case C-182/06 (Lakebrink). For a discussion of the Schumacker
case law, see Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 12.
80 Case C-39/10 (Commission v. Estonia).
81 Case C-9/14 (Kieback).
82 For a discussion of the Schumacker case law, Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch.
12.
83 Case C-283/15 (X).
84 In the Renneberg judgment, this was already decided for a non-
resident taxpayer who earned all his income in The Netherlands. In
that case, the ECJ found the situation of a resident and a non-
resident comparable and that discrimination would arise from the
fact that the personal and family circumstances of Mr Renneberg (i.
e. his negative income from an owner occupied dwelling in
Belgium) would not be taken into account under Dutch tax legisla-
tion. However, this case differs in the sense that only 60% of the
income is earned in The Netherlands.
85 Ros, supra n. 1, at Ch. 12, 294–296.
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person’s ability to pay and where these circumstances
should be taken into account, because these circum-
stances are explained very differently in the tax systems
of Member States. By determining which circumstances
effect a person’s ability to pay and where they should be
taken into account, the ECJ is moving on a territory that
is best left to the (European) legislator.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The case law discussed in section 2 points out that the ECJ
has chosen for a narrower interpretation of its case law on
EU citizenship. The discussed case law shows that the CRD
is now both ‘the floor and ceiling’ of EU citizenship rights and
that the ECJ’s earlier ‘fundamental status of EU citizenship’
rhetoric in relation to the right to social assistance in the
host Member State for an economically inactive EU citizen is
toned down. The case law on EU citizenship also seems to
point to the recognition of the centrality of the nationality
link of an EU citizen over any other transnational status.
However, as section 3 point out, the introduction of
EU citizenship has also influenced the ECJ’s interpreta-
tion of the market freedoms. The market freedoms are
no longer merely tools for the construction of the inter-
nal market. The market freedoms are now seen as
sources of a broader right, implying that those who
have exercised their right to move should not be subject
to unnecessary regulation, to a disproportionate interfer-
ence with their right to pursue an economic activity. An
explanation for this broad interpretation of the market
freedoms by the ECJ can be found in the view that the
ECJ is in the process of reconceptualizing the market
freedoms as part of a broader EU citizenship right for all
economically active EU citizens; the right to pursue an
economic activity in a cross border context, irrespective
of whether the economically active EU citizen contri-
butes to the aims of the internal market. In this view,
the market freedoms are no longer instrumental rights,
but are rights granted to EU citizens for their owns sake
and can, therefore, be considered as fundamental eco-
nomic rights.
The distinction in the case law of the ECJ between
economically inactive EU citizens and economically
active EU citizens clearly restates the importance of
the centrality of the market citizen in the ECJ’s case
law. While, at this moment, the ECJ case law on EU
citizenship reflects a conservative approach to EU citi-
zens’ rights, the case law on economically active EU
citizens can be explained under a broad fundamental
economic rights approach. In this regard, it remains
the question if the ECJ will uphold its broad funda-
mental economic rights approach in future
Schumacker case law by furthering an ‘always some-
where approach’ under which personal and family cir-
cumstances always have to be taken into account
somewhere, having as a possible consequence that
negative income from an owner occupied dwelling
must be set off in full wherever there is taxable income
to do so at the expense of Member State tax auton-
omy. It seems that under the current change in public
appetite for EU citizenship, the ECJ finds that some
EU citizens are more equal than others. A perception
far away from a true fundamental status for EU citi-
zens; economically active or not.
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